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  1. The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles is an existing threat, which is increasing in severity. Ballistic missiles, particularly when coupled with weapons of mass destruction, are a serious threat to Europe, Russia and the United States.
  2. The relationship between the United States and Russia should not be based on adversarial principles, and the current strategic paradigm that is based on mutually assured destruction is not adequate to address the emerging security concerns of Russia and the West.
  3. It is imperative that the United States and Russia begin a broad dialogue to seek out ways of moving towards a broad strategic paradigm that is more appropriate for addressing the new security environment, as well as taking advantage of new opportunities. The participation of European and other allied and friendly states will be essential for certain elements of this dialogue which impinge on regional security problems.

    The end state of this dialogue will remain undefined until it is actually achieved. However, the terms of the dialogue should encourage an initial accommodation on the most pressing strategic issues, co-operative approaches to resolving security issues where appropriate and, ultimately, collaborative efforts to address fundamental problems like proliferation.
  4. In the near term, the United states and Russia share the strategic objective of protecting their interests and populations from the limited ballistic missile threat. Also, neither the United States nor Russia intends to jeopardise each other's deterrent capabilities.

    These objectives must be addressed immediately and in a range of ways, including:
  • Opening a dialogue consistent with the NATO-Russia Founding Act for a regional defence of Europe or other theatre missile defences.
  • Agreement to move forward on the entire complex of offensive and defensive strategic arms control agreements to allow unambiguously for highly effective limited national missile defences while preserving the retaliatory capabilities of the United States and Russia.
  • Initiation of discussions to adjust rationally strategic offensive forces consistent with the above and our intention to foster a more co-operative security relationship between Russia and the United States.

These interim steps are designed to forestall a crisis until such time as our recommended dialogue has produced a climate in which the remaining vestiges of our adversarial history have been overcome.


The genesis of the Erice Workshop was the recognition that non-strategic ballistic and cruise missile proliferation, and the threat it poses, demands immediate attention. The problem of proliferation creates common risks that are best addressed by co-operative effort. The intent of the Erice Workshop is to serve as a starting point for a common dialogue and future co-operation.


  1. The participants at the seminar discussed the problem of possible co-operation and collaboration between the United States, Europe and Russia in creating a European system of non-strategic ballistic and cruise missile defence. Initially this would involve co-ordinated operations by existing and planned non-strategic missile defence systems of participating nations. In the future, it may evolve into a more fully integrated approach to programmes and planning.
  2. The participants stressed the importance of developing such a system in view of the increasing risks to European security as a result of the growing proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. It was recognised that these risks could emanate from many different areas of the globe.
  3. During their discussions, the participants agreed that co-operation in non-strategic European missile and cruise missile defence is not only possible, but also desirable.
  4. Such co-operation would enhance the security of all participating nations and help improve regional stability.
  5. The geographic parameters of the proposed European ballistic and cruise missile defence would include the territory of Europe and Russia. This could take several forms such as:

    (1) all of Europe and Russia,

    (2) regions within Europe and Russia, or

    (3) individual countries and Russia.
  6. The participants agreed that consideration should also be given to non-strategic ballistic and cruise missile defences for expeditionary forces operating outside Europe.
  7. The participants agreed that co-operation in such systems should take account of all aspects of missile defence. Co-operation could include, inter alia, the following:
  • development of a flexible multi-layer missile defence architecture, which could include both centralised and decentralised management;
  • information support from sources including ground- ,air-, and space-based assets, and that this support considers the fusion of information in the context of national security realities;
  • firing units; and
  • command and control.


The Working group believes that the programme that was initiated by our workshop in Erice will result in a series of future activities. These activities should be structured to create political support within participating nations for formal programmes of co-operation and collaboration on a non-strategic European ballistic and cruise missile defence. The Erice Working Group could serve as a core management group for structuring these programs and follow-on activities.

SIGNED at Erice, Sicily, on the 8th April 1998

Colette de la Barre
Office of the Sec. of the Air Force for Space, Washington D.C., USA
Dr Gregory Canavan
Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA
Mr Douglas R. Graham
Lockheed Martin Organisation, USA
Professor Reiner K. Huber
Universität der Bundeswhehr München, Germany
Dr Andrei Krutskikh
Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow
Gen. Vladimir Kuklev
Ministry of Defence, Russia
Professor R. A. Mason
University of Birmingham, UK
Col. Jack Petri
US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium
Professor Andrei Piontkovsky
Strategic Studies Centre, Moscow, Russia
Ambassador David J. Smith
Global Horizons Inc., Annandale, USA
Mr Willis Stanley
National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, USA
Professor Vitalii Tsygichko
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Mr Dennis M. Ward
US Senate, Washington D.C., USA
David Wiencek
Lancaster University, Bethesda, USA


This Statement by the World Federation of Scientists Working Group on Missile Proliferation and Defence does not necessarily imply any endorsement or commitment by the World Federation of Scientists or any Government Institution or Organisation. 

The World Federation of Scientists welcomes your views and comments on the threat of missile proliferation and on this Statement. Please address all correspondence to: